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She saw the prairie, flat in giant patches or rolling in long hummocks. The 
width and bigness of it, which had expanded her spirit an hour ago, began to 
frighten her. It spread out so; it went on so uncontrollably; she could never 
know it. (Lewis, 1996, p. 28) 
 
[An orator] has not a knowledge of all causes, and yet he ought to be able to 
speak upon all. On what causes, then, will he speak? On such as he has 
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learned. The same will be the case also with regard to the arts and sciences; 
those on which he shall have to speak he will study for the occasion, and on 
those which he has studied he will speak. (Quintillian, trans. 1990, p. 333) 
The rise of professionalism, which in the United States commenced in earnest in the early 
years following the Civil War (1861-1865), has been characterized for more than a 
century by disciplinary regimes under which academic research agenda have been closely 
proscribed. Notwithstanding, many US scholars, who may have been trained in or hired 
directly into interdisciplinary programs or departments, today range over one or more 
zones of disciplinary contact. A scholar in an era of relaxing discipline, I, like countless 
others, navigate a sea of potential topics, methods, and epistemologies, a “sea with its 
thousand roads” (to appropriate a figure of Michel Foucault [1965, p. 11], who, 
coincidentally, was reflecting on madness). 
As academe becomes more integrated as a location of research, the question of what 
might or should constitute a program of study will become increasingly perplexing. This 
essay relates how researchers influenced by the gravitational pull of multiple disciplines 
might develop a rationale rendering defensible a scholarly path not only to ourselves but 
to colleagues and students who hold comparatively traditional views on disciplinarity. 
Personal experiences, interests, and convictions have profoundly influenced my own 
decisions about the subjects that will engage my attention, the inquiries to which I will 
dedicate my life’s energy. 
1. The Art of Rhetoric as Self-Discipline  
Plato defines rhetoric as the art of influencing the soul through words; Aristotle, the 
faculty of discovering in the particular case the available means of persuasion; Quintilian, 
the science of speaking well, or that art or talent by which discourse is adapted to its end. 
These founding fathers of the tradition do insist that rhetoric’s sphere is the study of 
verbal language. We reside, however, in “a spiritual city, subject to sudden disturbances 
for which neither architects nor mathematicians have made allowance” (Kandinsky, 
1947, p. 31). Although most rhetoricians continue to conceive of the discipline as 
concerned with the study of writing and speaking to persuade, it happens that, usually 
with a nod or a bow to the ancients, multifarious subjects have entered rhetoric’s tent; 
some have remained; others have departed and may return; still others, unknown, 
approach. In the 1500s, for instance, Listenius founded musica poetica on the rhetoric of 
the oration. His work has been furthered by composers and music theorists throughout the 
centuries, including Leonard Bernstein (1918-1990), who lectured extensively on the 
literary language of concert music (see The Unanswered Question: Six Talks at Harvard, 
a collection of his thoughts on this theme [Bernstein, 1976]). Visual images and graphic 
design are rhetorical commonplaces today, and recent issues of key disciplinary journals 
have included articles analyzing physical processes or sports activities.  
Rhetoricians are perhaps uniquely positioned to engage in interdisciplinary research, as 
Cicero suggests when he writes, “No man can be an orator complete in all points of merit 
who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts” (Cicero, trans. 1990, 
Page 2 of 23 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
p. 202). The question that concerns me is in fact how the rhetorician, faced with this 
crush of possibilities, is to define rhetoric for the purpose of formulating a scholarly 
program. My own solution has been to conceptualize the art of rhetoric as self-discipline, 
an extension of inner necessity and a framework in which I may come to integrate the 
more rational and more artistic, more public and more private elements of my personality 
by exploring the influences of symbols on my life. Rather than attempt to nudge others 
down the path I am following, or indeed to urge any path at all, I offer in this essay a 
means of focusing one’s research. Although I present my ideas within the discipline I 
know best--rhetoric, the suggestions I offer here will, I hope, be relevant to readers from 
many fields.  
Elinor W. Gadon (2007), author of “My Life’s Journey as Researcher,” narrates her 
struggle to make an academic career a “journey of discovery--of who [she is], of the 
world around [her], and the meaning of life” (section 2). She recalls this struggle as 
rooted in an early childhood episode during which “an instinctive and uncontrollable 
desire to know the world, and not just be a mute participant” (section 3)--an episode 
centering around inquiry, pleasure, and self-expressiveness, of “bodily experience fully 
lived” (section 3)--was physically disciplined, thus foreshadowing the transgressive 
character of the self-contextualizing research she would pursue as an adult in academe. 
Ultimately, her journey took her to India, where she became a pilgrim seeking validation 
of art and experience as a compass for her scholarly course, and to the California Institute 
of Integrative Studies, where she designed a PhD program in women’s studies that 
allowed students to create “their own approach to integral research they named ‘organic 
inquiry,’ which used ongoing self-reflection as a key practice” (section 4). 
As an interdisciplinary scholar interested in pursuing research that reflects social and 
institutional goals in light of the personal, I have found it useful to compare Gadon’s 
narrative to Gerard de Zeeuw’s (2005) writing on high quality experience. Whereas 
Gadon focuses on the individual in order to explore research methods and topics, De 
Zeeuw’s concern is an alternative to knowledge acquisition as it is often understood by 
humanists. De Zeeuw describes such experience as emerging from a collaborative 
process depending on the functioning of what members of my own discipline would 
likely term discourse communities. According to De Zeeuw, “high quality experience is 
not achieved by individuals, but only by a special kind of collective, that which achieves 
stability as part of executing its collective task” (section 5). This type of experience is by 
no means antithetical to the type Gadon describes, for she relates how powerful her 
desires to be part of a family, a religious community, and an academic circle have been, 
as well as how profoundly these collectives have influenced the quality of experience she 
has gained. The key insight that De Zeeuw brings to a discussion of interdisciplinarity is 
the notion that the intellectual freedom Gadon and so many academicians seek is made 
possible, on one level, through the work of multiple collectives. All collectives, read 
disciplines here, constrain members and so restrict their freedom. Yet each of us “may 
become a member of many stable collectives [e.g., disciplines] in parallel--and in this 
way gain the ability to freely choose what high quality experiences to acquire and when” 
(De Zeeuw, 2005, section 6). Loss of one type of freedom thus can be offset by increase 
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of another type. Interdisciplinarity represents, in this scheme, a virtually boundless source 
of potential high quality experience for scholars. 
The founder of nonrepresentational painting in the West, Wassily Kandinsky (1947) is 
remarkably clear on the cultural importance of both collective and personal 
responsibility. Kandinsky has theorized “inner necessity” for colleagues in visual art, in a 
way that can help scholars across academe address the question of how to design a 
scholarly program in an era of dilating interdisciplinarity. His thoughts on art and artists 
are applicable to scholarship and scholars: 
(1) Every artist, as a creator, has something in him which demands 
expression (this is the element of personality). (2) Every artist, as the child 
of his time, is impelled to express the spirit of his age (this is the element of 
style)--dictated by the period and particular country to which the artist 
belongs (it is doubtful how long the latter distinction will continue). (3) 
Every artist, as a servant of art, has to help the cause of art (this is the 
quintessence of art, which is constant in all ages and among all 
nationalities). (p. 52) 
This article, for instance, was generated out of my own inner necessity to explore a self-
referential formulation of rhetoric, one that reflects a personality influenced by a love for 
art and science and a concern for the culture that has shaped me, examples of the first two 
sources of inner necessity. Regarding the assistance I might give my colleagues in 
rhetoric, or how I might act as “a servant of art,” I hope to contribute to an awareness that 
music and spirituality are part of a vast, largely unplumbed, aquifer of fit rhetorical topics 
and that the personal has a place in our discipline. 
Lloyd Bitzer writes that a rhetorical “exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is 
a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should 
be” (as cited in Goodwin, 1998, p. 1). I suggest that the rhetorician’s inner necessity is 
the primary exigence and ideally should motivate rhetorical acts. Such a rhetorical 
practice I call a “self-discipline.” But the art of rhetoric as self-discipline is not 
synonymous with “rhetoric as self-expression.” “Self-discipline” implies dissatisfaction 
with the self in its “natural” state as well as an effort to direct one’s impulses 
constructively. 
The art of rhetoric as self-discipline insists on rhetoric’s transformational potential: the 
rhetorician is engaged in self-reflection and open to discovering and exploring those 
topics that have the most powerful effects on her; equally important are her attempts to 
articulate personal interests in ways that she believes will contribute positively to her 
culture. Bearing in mind her experiences, aptitudes, needs, and desires, the rhetorician 
attempts to identify and to fulfill her true and most pressing obligations to self and 
society. Rhetorical exigencies arising from injustice, for instance, would not fail to be 
addressed by rhetoricians engaged in self-discipline. Rhetoric so conceived has many of 
the strengths of the perspectivist approach to criticism advocated by Ellen Messer-
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Davidow, for her approach to the limits of subjectivity and objectivity as theoretical 
postures  
would bring together, in processes of knowing, the personal and cultural, 
subjective and objective--replacing dichotomies with a systemic 
understanding of how and what we see. It would explain how we affiliate 
culturally, acquire a self-centered perspective, experience the perspectives 
of others, and deploy multiple perspectives in inquiry. (as cited in Simpson, 
1996, p. 88) 
Taken together, the terms self and discipline frame a model of the art of rhetoric that 
acknowledges the significance of the rhetorician’s inner life in choice of subject and 
mode of study and that simultaneously requires on her part an authentic effort to make 
her activity socially vital. 
2. Inquiry Before the Disciplines  
I have envisioned a rhetoric that coaxes out of the shadows those elements of the 
rhetorician’s self that tend to be ignored or disciplined in favor of a less perspectival 
knowledge, and as a result I have often found myself returning to the “ancient debate” 
between philosophy and rhetoric. Philosophy, as Aristotle taught, was an objective 
method for establishing truth; rhetoric, a means of persuading people to believe what the 
speaker wished. Aristotle set the terms of that debate, and by invoking the distinction one 
accepts his terms. But since at least the time of Francis Bacon, traditional philosophy has 
been challenged methodically and its founding assumptions disputed so successfully that 
by now little of that discipline’s objectivism is defended seriously. 
Rhetoricians of our day, with their own understandings of language, truth, and power, 
have been subjecting Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric to rigorous critique and reform as 
well. Susan Jarratt (2002), for instance, has militated for “a broader definition of 
‘rhetoric’ and what counts as ‘rhetorical’ practice” (p. 12), recommendations that are at 
the heart of this article. Citing Jeffrey Walker’s (2000) claims that lyric poetry is “the 
nearest relation to, and indeed the precursor for . . . the later ‘rhetorical’ tradition” and 
that the lyric served as “culturally and politically significant discourse” (Walker, p. 140), 
Jarratt follows in the tradition of “numerous feminist historians of rhetoric” who “have 
argued for the necessity of identifying rhetorical practices outside the boundaries of the 
named tradition.” She finds strong support for her position in Page duBois’ (1995) 
research on Sappho, which “identifies ancient rhetoric as a contested field with no stable 
point of origin” and “terms the self-referential texts of the rhetorical tradition 
‘metarhetoric,’ freeing up ‘rhetoric’ for wider use.” 
Like these feminist historians, I believe it is an appropriate time to look back as well as 
forward, but well past the horizon established by Aristotle, to prior thinkers, that is, to the 
pre-Socratics, women and men who most accurately might be called inquirers. Their 
broadness of mind and intellectual integrity are reminiscent of the “insatiable curiousity, . 
Page 5 of 23 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
. . sense of adventure, and commitment to value-laden education” that Gadon (2006) 
ascribes to the “researcher par excellence” (section 1). 
According to Richard McKirahan (1994), the project of the pre-Socratics is best 
understood in light of the Greek word historeô, or “‘inquiry,’ a general term that is 
different from ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ as we understand them in that it does not 
prescribe a specific subject matter or method” (p. 75, emphasis mine). Suggesting an 
enterprise vastly larger in scope than our history, historeô entailed active investigation--if 
not eye-witness examination--and knowing, not through synthesis of the wisdom of the 
ages, but through the inquiring subject’s critical evaluation of observation and 
experience. Friedrich Nietzsche (1962) writes that the pre-Socratics, Greeks of “the tragic 
age” who began practicing this type of inquiry in about 600 B.C.E., constituted the “pure 
types” for all subsequent philosophers (p. 32). 
The pre-Socratic inquirers, the prototypes for all philosophers and rhetoricians and in fact 
for all scholars who followed were not, as is likely in the disciplines today, constructing 
knowledge incrementally within an already-fortified edifice although they were part of a 
loose knowledge tradition, to be sure. They speculated widely and wildly about the 
structure of the universe, the role of the gods, the place of humans, the possibilities for 
culture. They were unabashedly preoccupied with themselves and their places in the 
universe. It is their spirit that I believe has the power to revitalize the arts of rhetoric 
today. Inquiry into spirituality and sound, to name just a few of the topics long 
marginalized in a logocentric discipline such as my own, much to the detriment of human 
flourishing, has an extensive history in Western thought and can be traced at least as far 
back as Hesiod. (Appendices A and B present potential research topics for 
interdisciplinary rhetorical research in these fields.) The Greeks had addressed these 
subjects in depth before the appearance of the Sophists or Aristotle’s demarcation of the 
boundary between rhetoric and philosophy. 
2.1. Spirituality and the Pre-Socratic Inquirers  
The pre-Socratics were preoccupied with sifting religious conceptions. Sappho of Lesbos, 
born around 610 B.C.E., most likely participated in women’s religious festivals 
sponsored by the shrine complex in the island of Lesbos, which housed the sanctuary of 
Hera, Zeus, and Dionysus (Walker, 2000, p. 223). Sappho frequently addressed her 
poems to the gods, including Hera, the Muses, and Eros, but because of her own amatory 
disposition, treated Aphrodite as a favorite and confidante. That she was visited by the 
gods and spoke with them, as she describes in her poetry, was, “for Sappho undoubtedly 
reality,” writes Hermann Frankel (1962). “She associate[d] with the gods of her world as 
did the epic heroes. . . . For her the gods [did] not stand in another, separate space behind 
human existence” (p. 185). 
The Pre-Socratics, who lived between about 610 and 425 B.C.E., evidenced, on the 
whole, a deep spirituality. One of the many qualities that makes these thinkers 
remarkable is their interest in critiquing established religions and in creating systems 
better able to answer their own spiritual needs. Those who came after Sappho were more 
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likely to demonstrate skepticism towards than respect for such anthropomorphic 
conceptualizations of divinity. Thales of Miletus demythologized physical processes, for 
instance, by claiming that earthquakes were the result of the literal movement of water 
and not the handiwork of Poseidon. And according to Anaximander of Miletus, “that 
which truly is . . . cannot possess definite characteristics, or it would come-to-be and pass 
away like all the other things. In order that coming-to-be shall not cease, primal being 
must be indefinite” (McKirahan, 1994, p. 47). Asserting that the gods had nothing to do 
with creating or sustaining the universe, Anaximenes of Miletus, too, broke with the 
anthropomorphic tradition. Xenophanes of Colophon “lash[ed] the Olympians with vigor 
and point[ed] the way to a rational theology” (p. 60), claiming among other things that 
Hesiod’s Theogeny was impious because it denied the gods’ eternality. Pythagoras of 
Samos endorsed the doctrine of transmigration and claimed to recall a former life as a 
certain fisherman named Pyrhus; he further dissolved the barrier between gods and 
humans, for body and soul were separate according to his system, and all humans, 
animals, and plants had not only a physical form but an eternal essence. Pythagoras 
preached self-purification to his followers, the akousmatikoi, who embraced his beliefs, 
practiced his numerology, and honored his sometimes bizarre proscriptions. Dispensing 
with many of the revolutions in religious thought that had preceded him, Heraclitus of 
Ephesus, a man otherwise dissatisfied with many things, evidenced, like Sappho, respect 
for the gods and their rituals. In contrast, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae postulated the nous, 
or the cosmogonic “mind,” the “universal cosmic principle of change,” which “knows all 
things that are being mixed together and separated off and separated apart” and “sets in 
order all things” (p. 221). Empedocles of Acragas believed himself to be a fallen god, or 
one of the daimones, and his worldview, which posited a universe governed by two 
forces--love and strife.  
2.2. The Senses and the Pre-Socratic Inquirers  
Likewise, these ancient Greeks dispensed with commonsense notions of the relations 
among the senses, the mind, and truth. Posing impenetrable questions regarding the 
nature of perception, many of which, in various forms, recur in our own conversations 
about the possibilities and limitations of objectivity and subjectivity, the pre-Socratics set 
about establishing frameworks for inquiry that more closely reflected their own 
certainties.  
In Sappho’s poetry, the highest purpose of the senses is to perceive the beautiful/the love 
object. So doing, the body is loosened and the senses are overwhelmed, charmed, 
entranced, drunken (Frankel, 1962); hypopoetic existence signals abandonment by the 
goddess of love. In sharp contrast, Anaximander viewed the senses critically, rejecting 
“some sense-based judgments in favor of others, and [appealing] to mathematical and 
logical considerations” to prove that the earth was stable at the center of the universe 
(McKirahan, 1994, p. 40). Recognizing the limits within which human perception takes 
place, Xenophanes observed that “if god had not created yellow honey, [humans] would 
say that figs are far sweeter” (p. 68). Heraclitus believed that the senses could be put to 
appropriate use by the wise only, for “eyes and ears are bad witnesses to people if they 
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have barbarian souls” (p. 118). He also observed that inasmuch as nature must be 
interpreted, language cannot be expected to be transparent.  
Synthesizing much of the dialogue on perception that had come before him and thereafter 
making an astonishing leap, Parmenides of Elea constructed “the first explicit statement 
of the contrast between reason and the senses, which immediately became and has since 
remained one of the focal points of philosophical discussion” (p. 165). Although mortals 
see plurality in the world, Parmenides considered the senses impediments to discovering 
the truth about reality, which he believed to be One. Thus, by reason, he said, man 
approaches the truth more closely than by sense perception. In Nietzsche’s (1962) words, 
both Parmenides and his student Zeno of Elea took as the “starting point of their proof . . 
. the wholly unprovable, improbable assumption that with our capacity to form concepts 
we possess the decisive and highest criterion as to being and nonbeing, i.e., as to 
objective reality and its antithesis” (p. 87).  
According to Heraclitus, “sight tells falsehoods” (McKirahan, 1994, p. 118) although 
“eyes are more accurate witnesses than the ears” (p. 119). Parmenides asserted that 
mortals are benighted because they accept as reality what they see. Anaxagoras’s paradox 
of color was meant to confirm that the eyes fail to see truly, for if a drop of black paint is 
mixed into a bucket of white, the color will change, but the eye will not distinguish this 
change until many more drops of black are added. Yet he reasserted that the senses, 
though feeble, helped humans to know the world.  
Although Zeno and Parmenides distrusted the senses, and especially hearing, the 
Pythagorians sought transcendental truth through music. Credited with having discovered 
the intervals of octave, fifth, and fourth, Pythagoras realized that by placing a finger 
directly in the center of a monochrome’s string and strumming, a musician creates a tone 
one octave above the tone of the string plucked when loose. By placing a finger two-
thirds up the string and plucking, the musician creates a tone one fifth above the original 
tone. Finally, by placing the finger three-quarters of the way up the string and plucking, 
the musician creates a tone one fourth above the original tone. These tones can be 
represented by the ratios 1:1, 1:2, 2:3, and 3:4, the denominators of which form the 
“tetractys of the decad” (because one plus two plus three plus four equals ten), which the 
Pythagoreans considered sacred ratio and by which they “swore their most solemn oaths” 
(McKirahan, 1994, p. 93).  
Since, like all the pre-Socratics, Pythagoras obviously belonged to no formal discipline, 
he arrived at choices of subject matter in ways that scholars in the twentyfirst century 
may be unaccustomed to. When determining what research to pursue, we might bear in 
mind our undergraduate and graduate educations, the journals and books that respected 
peers read and contribute to, and departmental, college, and university guidelines for 
achieving promotion and tenure. But the case of Pythagoras suggests that the pre-
Socratics indulged what we would probably describe as avocational interests. Clearly, 
Pythagoras was musically inclined; whether he discovered the octave or not, he enjoyed 
fiddling around with musical instruments. By exploring this knack deeply, he 
transformed a hobby into a heuristic that allowed him to explore the harmony of the 
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spheres: ultimately, he and his students were satisfied that he had discovered fundamental 
laws of the cosmos in a one-stringed instrument. 
3. The Rhetoric of Music: An Illustration of Claiming the Art of 
Rhetoric as Self-Discipline  
As a young woman, I indulged in what Roland Barthes calls the mimetic fantasy, and as 
an amateur musician found much pleasure and no small amount of pain in my studies. 
The pain arose from recognizing I would never be a brilliant Lucia, or, failing that, a folk 
singer of any distinction, or even, in those last dark hours, an unobjectionable 
accompanist; the pleasure, from hard-won competencies and from listening to others do 
what I longed to myself. When in my midthirties I sensed that the possibility of a life 
dedicated to music had abandoned me, I enrolled in a graduate program in rhetoric. 
To my delight, I reeled beneath rhetoric’s vast tent and often heard a kind of music there. 
Yet I soon realized that my discipline tended to define itself in technical, pedagogical, 
theoretical, and political terms of a rather uniform timbre and range. Strange, I thought, 
for a field more like Henry James’s “loose baggy monster” than any other coherent field 
of study alive and vibrating in the world! And yet by no means did I question the 
importance of what was being accomplished. It seemed to me only that, given the view, 
more of us might be leaping the stile. What was being ignored was a broader and 
broadening sense of what rhetoric is and of what is worth studying, and a sense that less 
proscribed discussion and more pleasure are birthrights of this profession. 
The ancient Greeks situated music as a branch of mathematics and, for hundreds of years 
after Plato, musical training in the West was considered fundamental to ethical, 
intellectual, and even professional development. But music plays only a minor part in 
public education in the United States today. In this context, it is unsurprising that music’s 
connection to rhetoric is nearly inaudible, although interest in music is recurrent 
throughout the rhetorical tradition: Plato, Boethius, Augustine, Bacon, Wollstonecraft, 
and Nietzshe (among many others) have remarked upon it. This section explores how the 
discipline of rhetoric might be enriched through the study of music. The heuristic I 
choose for this exploration was created by one of the founders of the tradition, Aristotle, 
who saw all discourse as created for the purpose of persuasion through appeals to ethos, 
logos, or pathos, a taxonomy still widely applied by rhetoricians.  
According to musicologist K. Marie Stolba (1998), ethos had two prevailing senses for 
the Greeks: (a) the Aristotelian sense of morals and character and (b) defining aspects of 
a musical mode that were thought to affect both. The Phrygian mode, associated with 
Dionysus, was thought to encourage violence and emotion; the Mixolydian mode, tender 
restraint and mournfulness; the Dorian mode, chastity and fortitude; the Lydian mode, 
amorousness. The assumption of an especially direct connection between music and soul 
was also Augustine’s, who first resisted listening to chants because of their sensuality but 
later rationalized that, being directed at God, they had beneficial effects on human 
character. In What is Art? Leo Tolstoy (1960) deplored the degenerate fans of opera and, 
by extension, the effects of all “trivialized” forms of art on their performers and 
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audiences. Today, discomfort with Rap music’s misogynistic lyrics is commonplace, and 
concerned parents will insist that music CDs be labeled for graphic sex or violence. Thus, 
belief in the power of music to degrade individual character and society endures. 
Music can also be shown to involve the rhetorical appeal to logos, or logic--not only in 
terms of the obvious issues of textual settings or of conventional patterns, for example, 
aria and variation or the sonata form, but in many subtle, cabalistic, and, I presume, for 
most of us, mainly hidden ways. Gregorian chants were based on three intervals--the 
unity, the fourth, and the fifth, since these had been acknowledged in Greek 
musicomathematical theory to be “perfect.” Up until the middle ages, the chant did not 
allow intervals of thirds or sixths, intervals without which contemporary popular music, 
let alone Baroque, Classical, and Romantic music, would be unrecognizable. The chant’s 
“strangeness” to our ears derives precisely from these constraints, which can be traced to 
Pythagoras’s mathematical explorations. J. S. Bach’s (1685-1750) St. Matthew Passion 
has been shown to base certain passages on the number 14 (a biblically important 
number, as with the generations leading up to and away from the Babylonian captivity, 
and with the generations leading up to Christ’s birth; 14 also happens to be the 
numerological representation of the name Bach. For an in-depth treatment of the 
mathematical sleight-of-hand occurring in this one composition, see Mellers, 1980). The 
logic of music is a preoccupation of modern classical composers. Béla Bartók (1881-
1945) based the first movement of his Music for Strings, Celeste, and Percussion on a 
Fibonacci series and on the “golden section.” Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992) composed at 
times by formally alternating whole and half-steps, incorporating rhythmic palindromes 
and constructing complex chords based on the higher harmonics of a fundamental tone. 
Milton Babbitt (1916-) has created highly sophisticated compositions based on all-
combinatorial and durational sets (personal conversation with C. Bleyle). John Corigliano 
(1938- ) won the 2001 Pulitzer Prize in Music for the Symphony No. 2 for String 
Orchestra, a composition that he characterized as a reverse fugue.  
It hardly needs stating that the key rhetorical term pathos, or the appeal to emotion, is 
fundamental to music. In the eighteenth century, “the musical aesthetic was most often 
discussed in terms of rhetoric. Just as it was the goal of rhetoric to persuade audiences, so 
it was the goal of music to move the listener” (Bonds, as cited in Whittall, 1993, p. 88). 
Outside of general notions of music’s emotional appeal to both humans and nonhumans, 
there were until the modern era conventional opinions about the emotional values of 
certain keys, just as there had been, earlier, such beliefs about the modes. For instance, 
the key of D major was associated with joy; the well-known Christmas song “Joy to the 
World,” written by George Frideric Handel (1685-1789) is in the key of D. The key of D 
minor was associated with somberness; Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827) chose it for 
his Missa Solemnis and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791) for his Requiem. The 
key of F major was associated with arcadia. Handel arias such as “He shall feed his 
flock” and “Come unto Him,” Johann Sebastian Bach’s (1685-1750) Christmas Oratorio, 
and the Pastoral Symphony of Beethoven all are written in the key of F major (personal 
conversation with C. Bleyle). King and Jensen (1995) identify a surprising intersection 
between Reggae and the imagined seat of the emotions: “Proclaimed throughout the 
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world as ‘music of the heart,’” they write, “the tempo of reggae (72-90 beats per minute) 
is similar to the pulse of the human heart” (p. 28). 
Richard Wagner (1813-1883) makes explicit the geometric expansion of emotional 
meaning made possible by the application of music to words:  
The characteristic distinction between the word poet and the tone poet 
consists in this: The word poet has concentrated an infinitude of scattered 
moments of action, sensation, and expression--only cognizable by the 
understanding--to a point the most accessible to his feeling; now comes the 
tone poet, who has to expand this concentrated, compact point to the utmost 
fullness of its emotional content. (Goldman & Springchorn, 1964, p. 207) 
4. But Isn’t Rhetoric Supposed to be About Politics?  
Any fear that to study music a rhetorician would need to abandon cultural critique and 
transformation for the tools and comforts of elite aesthetic discourse is unfounded. Like 
all modes of artistic expression, music is articulated to historical moments.  
Musical instruments made of mammoth bones have been dated to 18,000 B.C.E., and 
from these prehistoric artifacts a ligature between culture and music may be inferred as 
lasting. Music has long been a language associated with religious experience. The 
Hurrians of 1400 B.C.E. seemed to have used music exclusively for religious events; 
there is evidence from about 400 years later that the Hebrews were using ta’amim 
symbols to indicate melodic formulae in the Torah. Today, worship, no matter where, 
will almost surely involve singing, chanting, dancing, instrumental music, mantra, or 
azz’an.  
But why so many differences in musical tradition? “The art of sound lies entirely within 
the domain of culture,” writes Lévi-Strauss (1997, p. 107), and by this he means there is 
no “natural” music. According to music theorist Tomlinson, “the most profound and 
authentic meanings of music will be found not in musical works themselves but behind 
them, in the varieties of discourse that give rise to them” (as cited in Bose, 1996, p. 9).  
“Music is what I am going to speak about,” lectured Igor Stravinsky (1882-1971), “But 
before I do that, it is absolutely essential in order that this particular problem may be the 
better delimited and placed, that I say a few words to you in very general terms about the 
Russian Revolution” (Stravinsky, 1970, p. 99). Thus he introduced a series of personal 
observations on how Soviet music reflected and contributed to the political culture of his 
own day:  
In a new opera, In the Storm, they have even reached the point of making 
Lenin appear on the stage. As for the famous adaptations which I have just 
mentioned, I can tell you that quite recently the Nutcracker of Tchaikovsky 
was restored to the ballet repertory, not without modifying its plot and 
libretto, which were found to be of too mystical a coloring and thus 
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dangerous, as well as foreign, to the Soviet spectator. In a like manner, after 
endless hesitations and numerous revision, Glinka’s celebrated opera A Life 
for the Czar has once more taken place in the repertory under the title of 
Ivan Soussanine. The word Czar was replaced as the occasion required by 
the words Country, Homeland, and People. One should not seek an 
explanation of this patriotic setting in Glinka’s music, but rather in the 
national-defense propaganda. Lacking any authentic forms of expression of 
its own, the communist patriotism imposed upon the Soviet government by 
the pressure of events expressed itself, via subversion, through one of the 
purest masterpieces of classical Russian music, a masterpiece which had 
been conceived and composed in entirely different circumstances and 
embodied an entirely different meaning. (p. 113) 
A music teacher of mine, who embellished most lectures with political observations, was 
also a choir director at a local Methodist church and knowledgeable about the life of 
Martin Luther and the music evolving out of the Reformation. This teacher demonstrated 
how the secular song “Mein G’müth ist mir Verwirret,” which begins, “Mein gmuth ist 
mir verwirret/Das macht ein Junfrau zart,” or “My peace of mind is disturbed by a tender 
maiden,” was appropriated by J. S. Bach as the basis of his sublime aria “O Haupt voll 
Blut und Wunden,” or “O head full of blood and wounds,” the recurring chorale of the St. 
Matthew Passion. Indeed, Luther, to whom is attributed the unlevitical sentiment 
“Anyone who bad-mouths polyphony should be thrown in a pile of shit,” transformed 
many secular songs, even those with racy origins, into hymns (personal conversation with 
C. Bleyle). “Ein’ feste Burge ist unser Gott,” or “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God,” in 
many hymnals attributed to Luther, was a well-known theme on which inductees into 
guilds were required to produce variations. In addition to churchifying secular music, 
Luther tacitly authorized hymns such as “Erhalt uns, Herr, bei deinem Wort,” which 
expressed the sentiment “Lord, protect us by Thy word, And put an end to the murdering 
Pope and Turk.” German Protestants of the time produced a flourishing trade in parodies 
on Catholic hymns. (This is the converse political turn taken in the evolution of “O Haupt 
voll Blut und Wunden.”)  
Mozart’s operas Il barbiere di Siviglia and Don Giovanni, both based on the 
Beaumarchais plays that helped fuel the French Revolution, are additional examples of 
countless musical works with political overtones, as is the Ninth Symphony of 
Beethoven, who is said to have written the fourth movement, containing the chorus “Alle 
Menschen werden Brüder,” as a response to Napoleon’s coronation as emperor.  
A more contemporary example is Reggae, which “challenge[s] Jamaica’s neo-colonialist 
society’s attempts to keep whites at the top and blacks at the bottom of the socio-
economic structure” (King & Jensen, 1995, p. 17). King and Jensen classify Reggae as a 
music of protest, powerful by virtue of what it brings to “downpressed” groups--namely 
“an opportunity to participate publicly in voicing opinions which would normally by 
censored by the government” (p. 19). African-American spirituals, too, are richly 
rhetorical, in both political and poetic senses: “Deep River,” to provide one example, 
reflects the rhetoricomusical principles discussed by Thomas Morley (1557-1602) and 
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consciously applied by Handel, Thomas Weelkes (1575-1623) and others (Richards, in 
press).  
Wagner, who today may be as famous for his strident nationalism and anti-Semitism as 
for his Ring Cycle, makes the connection between music and politics explicit:  
The poet’s art has turned to politics: no one now can poetize, without 
politicizing. Yet the politician will never become a poet, precisely until he 
ceases to be a politician: but in a purely political world to be not a politician 
is as good as to say one does not exist at all; whosoever at this instant steals 
away from politics, he only belies his own being. (Goldman & Springchorn, 
1964, p. 148)  
Perhaps the reason we imagine that music is irrelevant to history is that we are not 
sufficiently knowledgeable about music or history. Quite literally, the ways in which 
musicians have participated in, and will continue to participate in, cultural transformation 
are endless.  
5. Discipline and Enculturate  
I still recall the disbelief I felt on the day more than a decade ago when I drove by my 
school’s performance hall and first beheld the behemoth state-of-the-art electronic 
billboard emblazoned with Coca-Cola’s logo. Since then, the student union “food court,” 
once a down-at-heels cafeteria furnished with defaced tables and treacherous chairs, has 
become a garishly lit warehouse of fast food joints running the multicultural gamut from 
Taco Ball to Panda Express. Dozens of campus computer labs have been “donated” by 
Apple or IBM. The agricultural and life sciences college have received lucrative contracts 
and grants from the agrichemical industry; the bioengineering department, from the 
biotech industry; the engineering college, from the military industrial complex. 
According to its public relations materials, the school has been at various times in its 
recent history the first-ranked US institution of higher education in terms of options and 
licenses based on technologies invented and among the top dozen such institutions in 
terms of patents, active licenses and options, and generation of start-up companies. The 
school also has established a busy group of institutes and centers aimed at servicing the 
state’s business needs, from management to research and development to fabrication. Its 
most illustrious research park often houses more than 50 companies linking the school to 
industry and business. In sum, the environment in which I received my PhD was redolent 
of corporate culture as invoked by Henry A. Giroux (2002) and others, for this school 
also was characterized by “an ensemble of ideological and institutional forces that 
function[ed] politically and pedagogically both to govern organizational life through 
senior managerial control and to fashion compliant workers, depoliticized consumers, and 
passive citizens” (p. 429).  
Towards the end of my studies, I received an announcement that contained a list of 
dissertations just published in my program. I was astonished by the similarity in titles 
when I considered the students who had produced them: none of their unique interests or 
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talents was to be deduced from the titles of their research. The titles concerned digital 
literacy (identifying information has been changed in this paragraph), and I recalled that 
this was a special interest of the faculty directing those dissertations. Although I knew 
that the students might have chosen their chairs precisely because they themselves hoped 
to study this topic, I could not help wondering. One of the authors had frequently told me 
about her ongoing participation in multicultural education among gay high-school 
students participating in a playwriting workshop. Yet another of the authors, who was 
married to a Kuwaiti, had been considering a dissertation on the depictions of Middle 
Easterners appearing in Time magazine after 9/11. Outside of these authors, I knew of 
other colleagues who had been warned against including personal information in their 
dissertations; one had been forbidden to do so. But reproduction of faculty through their 
students, if this in fact was what had been going on, would not have been unique to my 
school. What of that powerhouse rhetoric program on the East Coast, where students 
referred to themselves as “Jonesclones,” Jones being the name of an especially eminent 
faculty member?  
Not long after I was informed of the dissertation titles, I received this note in my e-mail 
inbox, from a graduate student writing to an interdepartmental listserv: 
Hi Everyone, 
 
I am writing this from dissertation hell . . . (actually from my little house in 
[state]). It just occurred to me that those of you who haven’t started your 
diss. might benefit from the wacky things I am learning about the process, 
so here goes. 
1. The diss. is as much about your major professor as it is about you and 
sometimes it’s even about “hands on” committee members. Credibility and 
ego are at stake all around. 
2. The diss. is a genre that we are not taught at [that institution]. However, it 
is a genre that is warped by the vision of your major professor, so in a sense 
it can’t be taught completely. 
3. You have to maintain your own vision. You have to OWN your diss.; get 
angry, argue. The process can become territorial--a real pissing contest. 
4. You go in with a plan and somewhere in the middle, all your positivity 
and motivation crash. You are left with only the desire to finish. You decide 
to write the dissertation, not THE dissertation. 
5. It is an insular process. No one gives a rat’s behind about your wonderful 
topic. Your major professor, your friends, and your partners are mostly 
concerned about the process and/or how close you are to finishing. You 
have to sustain excitement about your topic in isolation. 
6. Most importantly, you have to reach out for a boost from time to time. 
When you are thoroughly discouraged and depressed, ask those you trust to 
tell you you are pretty, witty, and wise. It may get you through the next 20 
or 30 pages. (But don’t ask your major professor; ego busting is part of the 
job description.) (Mohrbacher, personal communication, April 12, 2003) 
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Such strict disciplining of novice scholars is worlds away from the integral graduate 
education described by Gadon and referenced earlier in this article. 
“In ordinary existence,” Cixous writes, “Woman does not announce, does not begin 
things. It is agreed that she will not go after the object of her desire” (Cixous & Clément, 
1986, p. 117). Because the author of the e-mail failed to have these ordinary expectations 
of her education, she reacted to it allergically, as if to an anti-body: her major professor’s 
vision was warped, the writing process was a pissing contest, no one gave a rat’s behind 
for the student’s ideas, her motivation and positivity crashed, her ego was busted, and the 
dissertation needed to be aborted.  
I have written this essay with an interdisciplinary future in mind. In the present, however, 
as we all know, scholars who transgress disciplinary borders often do so at some risk. 
Like all symbolic systems, language, as Catherine Clément observes, gives rise to an 
“imaginary zone” of exclusion. She writes:  
It is that zone we must try to remember today . . . [for] societies do not 
succeed in offering everyone the same way of fitting into the symbolic 
order; those who are, if one may say so, between symbolic systems, in the 
interstices, offside, are the ones who are afflicted with a dangerous symbolic 
mobility (Cixous & Clément, 1986, pp. 6-7).  
Yet what, we might ask, is the function of a teacher? After all, has she not mastered a 
subject? Are students not paying to learn what she knows? Does she not have a 
responsibility to discipline? “What is the discourse of mastery?” Cixous asks Catherine 
Clément. Fittingly, she answers her own question: 
There is one. It is what calls itself “the law” but is presented as “the open 
door” in precisely such a way that you never go to the other side of the door, 
that you never go to see “what is mastery?” So you never will know that 
there is no law and no mastery. That there is no master. The paradox of 
mastery is that it is made up of a sort of complex ideological secretion 
produced by an infinite quantity of doorkeepers. (Cixous & Clément, 1986, 
p. 138) 
Teachers who strictly discipline advanced students (often colleagues in the teaching 
profession) are reinscribing their own values on those who may have something else to 
say altogether. Cixous envisions a form of love that also defines a healthy teacher-student 
relationship, one in which  
each would take the risk of other, of difference, without feeling threatened 
by the existence of an otherness, rather, delighting to increase through the 
unknown that is there to discover, to respect, to favor, to cherish. This love 
would not be trapped in contradictions and ambivalences entailing the 
murder of the other indefinitely. (Cixous & Clément, 1986, p. 78)  
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The process of sublimation, or of (literary) production, is the Ariadne’s thread by which 
the oppressed emerge from patriarchal structures. The corporatized university is such a 
structure, reproducing in the first case the Freudian family regimented by the patriarch 
and the patriarchically-identified woman, and resisted by neurotics and other children. 
But, as Clément notes, “The family does not exist in isolation, rather it truly supports and 
reflects the class struggle running through it” (Cixous & Clément, 1986, p. 152). 
The graduate student in the corporatized university, and especially the student of English 
studies, works in an exploitive system but is able to exit it through literary or other 
creative production. 
Everyone knows that a place exists which is not economically or politically 
indebted to all the vileness and compromise. That is not obliged to 
reproduce the system. That is writing. If there is a somewhere else that can 
escape the infernal repetition, it lies in that direction, where it writes itself, 
where it dreams, where it invents new worlds. (Cixous & Clément, 1986, p. 
72) 
The teacher, however, can ensure that no real liberation occurs within the institution by 
insisting that students’ writing reproduce her own ideas and values. But the creative 
student must break at least some of the respected old crockery, because what is is not 
good enough: 
Art is an expression of man’s need for a harmonious and complete life, that 
is to say, his need for those major benefits of which a society of classes has 
deprived him. That is why a protest against reality, either conscious or 
unconscious, active or passive, optimistic or pessimistic, always forms part 
of a really creative piece of work. (Trotsky, 1970, p. 111) 
The art of teaching is not to fill students’ heads with knowledge (the banking model 
discredited by Paulo Freire and so many others), but to help them embrace possibilities. 
The world as it is broken and anyone with eyes to see knows this. Teachers have their 
own ideas, but these evidently are not sufficient for the world, nor are they sufficient for 
students who are truly engaged in learning, who know that “thinking the thinkable is not 
worth the effort” (Cixous, 1993, p. 38)--let alone thinking the already thought! 
The dark side of institutional power was a frequent subject of Leon Trotsky, who, like 
Kandinsky, recognized the importance of inner necessity. Trotsky’s extensive aesthetic 
writings were generated in part out of ideological differences with Stalin, who believed 
that inquiry should be channeled by the powerful for the ends of the institution. The 
problems with this commandeering of inquiry were recognized around the world:  
The Marxian [academic] works do not transcend the limit of scholastic 
compilations which say over the same old ideas, endorsed in advance, and 
shuffled over the same old quotations according to the demands of the 
current administrative conjuncture. Millions of copies are distributed 
Page 16 of 23 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
through the state channels of books and brochures that are of no use to 
anybody, put together with the help of mucilage, flattery and other sticky 
substances. Marxists who might say something valuable and independent 
are sitting in prison, or forced into silence. (Trotsky, 1970, p. 104) 
“The duller and more ignorant the dictator,” Trotsky concluded, “the more he feels called 
upon to prescribe the development of science, philosophy, and art” (p. 131). 
As professional academics we are well aware of the pressures that graduates with 
interdisciplinary or otherwise unorthodox research agendas can encounter on entering the 
job market. It is our responsibility not only to apprise students of these pressures but also 
to explore the gaps in experience and understanding that our students hope to fill through 
a graduate education and, ultimately, a scholarly career. 
6. Conclusion  
My own discipline of rhetoric can be conceptualized not only as an abstract body of 
knowledge about communication generally or persuasion specifically but also as a series 
of unique collections of philosophies, theories, methodologies, tools, and modes 
instantiated in individuals, that is, unique, bodied, practicing rhetoricians. The more 
varied the collection, the more able the rhetorician and her discipline may be to make 
sense of the world, for, as Empedocles advised,  
Look with every means of apprehension, in whatever way each thing is 
clear,  
Not holding any sight more in trust than [what comes] through hearing, 
Or loud-sounding hearing above the things made clear by the tongue, 
And do not at all hold back trust in any of the other members, 
Whatever way there is a channel for understanding, but 
Understand each thing in whatever way it is clear. (McKirahan, 1994, p. 
235) 
From this perspective, an interest in music and spirituality, for instance, a disinclination 
to focus on a narrow set of subjects, and the study of alternative philosophies, theories, 
tools, and modes that such predilections might require would advantage the inquirer. 
Empedocles states an ancient rationale for triangulation of a kind, enjoining his students 
to allow the mind to question the certainties of the senses, and the senses to challenge the 
mind’s cherished beliefs. 
Turning for a last time to the pre-Socratics, we see that they not only were addressing 
themes of lasting value, but also were developing methods of inventing, arranging, and 
expressing thought. The pre-Socratics--scientists and oracles, philosophers and 
rhetoricians (or neither scientists nor oracles, neither philosophers nor rhetoricians)--
regularly invented through record-keeping, speculating, observing, being self-reflexive, 
measuring, generalizing, associating, interpolating and extrapolating, contradicting, 
defining, understating and overstating, identifying, analyzing difference, arguing both 
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sides, and generating principles, paradigms, patterns, theorems, reductions, paradoxes, 
metaphors, similes, maxims, and analogies. They arranged their thoughts according to 
cause and effect, extremes and intermediates, stages, processes, genealogies, oppositions, 
proofs deductive and inductive, sequences, taxonomies, parallelisms, ratios. Their styles 
were at times iconoclastic, satirical, skeptical, scholastic, rational, ornamented, polemic, 
prophetic. They wrote philosophical treatises, religious manuals, and epic and lyric 
poetry. 
These thinkers, who conducted their inquiries before the creation of the disciplines, 
represented, for Nietzsche, a republic of creative minds (Richards & David, 2008). By 
coming to know ourselves and to recognize our responsibilities more clearly, and by 
regularly experimenting with our ways of thought, knowledge, and expression, scholars 
across academe may also make a habit of that wonder which was part of the daily diet of 
the pre-Socratics, “dearest of all” thinkers to Nietzsche, “the collective representatives of 
the eternal intuitive type, the discoverers of ‘the beautiful possibilities of life’” 
(Nietzsche, 1962, p. 3). 
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APPENDIX A  
Possible Research Topics in the Rhetoric of Religion  
1. It is possible to explore organized religion and the faith of individuals by analyzing the 
religious talks given at the various places of worship, instrumental music used to enhance 
the experience, lyrics of the music or of passages read aloud by groups of attendees or by 
individuals, iconography in homes and places of worship, the aesthetic of the sacred 
places themselves. 
2. One might also address the possibility that there is a master narrative regarding 
religion that is provided by high-profile academic males. If so, are faithful academic 
women engaged in writing counternarratives in the feminist tradition? 
3. What is the role played by religious dogma in the lives of individuals? 
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4. Thinkers such as Meister Eckhardt defy the categorization of Christianity as rigid, etc.; 
is there a spectrum of approaches to religious dogma that could be discovered from 
among current writers on the topic? 
5. Religious hate crimes in the United States also are often racist events, e.g., the 
destruction of Black churches both in Birmingham during the Civil Rights era and the 
series of fires in the 1990s, the destruction of synagogues, the murder and harassment of 
Sikhs and Muslims after 9/11, the internment camps in Guatánemo Bay (death camps for 
certain Muslims). How can the tools and methods of rhetoric be used most effectively in 
addressing these issues? 
6. Religious diversity is as much a part of cultural diversity as ethnicity, race, and class. 
How and why are religious beliefs and practices being marginalized in the discipline of 
rhetoric and professional communication? 
7. Organized Christianity creates vast amounts of literature, e.g., The Watchtower and the 
Awake! of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, or the more generic Guideposts. What rhetorical 
strategies do these publishers use? How do their strategies compare to the strategies, say, 
of business or technical writers? 
8. What types of dialogues are being undertaken between members of different religions? 
9. What do public figures, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi, gain and 
what do they lose as a result of articulating spiritual belief to political movements? 
10. To what extent is the notion of “false consciousness” validated in organized 
religions? 
 
APPENDIX B  
Possible Research Topics in the Rhetoric of Film Music  
1. What is/has been the role of the director in the creation of film scores? 
2. What is the role of silence in film scores (case in point: the last 15 minutes of High 
Noon)? 
3. What effects can the use of a single song whose lyrics are known to the audience and 
which can therefore comment “wordlessly” on film action, have on the audience (e.g., 
Dmitri Tiomkin’s “Do Not Forsake Me” in High Noon)? 
4. In what ways is classical music used in film scores (e.g., Mendellsohn’s music in Max 
Rhinehardt’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream [1935])? 
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5. What is the effect of rock and roll compilation scoring on audience reception of films? 
6. What have been the roles played by musical performers of color in Hollywood film? 
7. What degree of independence is enjoyed by film composers now, and what has been 
enjoyed in the past? 
8. How do composers and directors collaborate? 
9. What is the role of disturbing music in film, i.e., music that would seem deliberately 
not to turn the spectator into an “untroublesome viewing subject” (e.g., Bernard 
Hermmann’s [1911-1975] music in Psycho [1960])? 
10. What types of information are not conveyable through film scores? 
11. Do film composers find themselves falling back on certain techniques to heighten 
visual meaning? Verbal meaning? 
12. In what ways are speech and sound effects connected to musical scores? 
13. What part do film scorers play in the recording of films? How do they collaborate 
with sound engineers, if at all? 
14. What strengths does music have as an art form that visual and verbal arts may not? 
15. What might an understanding of film scoring contribute to the art of Web design, if 
anything? 
16. What process do film composers use when they compose? 
17. Do they consider themselves artists, technicians, or professionals, and why? 
18. Under what circumstances is “aleatoric music” (chance music) used and why? 
19. Do composers attempt to understand the “poetic intent” of a film? If so, what type of 
adjustments might it lead them to make? 
20. What are the connections between opera and scoring for film? 
21. What are the cutting edge technologies in scoring today, and how important is 
technology to the art of film music? 
22. What is the status of women in the film scoring industry? 
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